M. Jane Young and Barbara Tedlock
Zuni Worldview: On the Beautiful and the Dangerous
While both Young and Bunzel agree on the religious importance of the images and the lack of a determinate naming process, they disagree on the role of the individual in interpretation[24] and whether the interpretive process is sensual or rational. This disparity may be related to the different methodologies involved, for Bunzel worked through an interpreter and sought to evoke images in the use of names, often receiving diverse groupings within clusters while Young relied more so on ostensive definition, perceiving the images as having the power to evoke narrative, using the term "metonymic" to describe the power of images to evoke where ambiguity is present in both meaning and form[25]. The one most notable aspect of Young's study in regard to the individuating function is the observance that Zuni interpreters "included the entire environmental setting of the rock art in discussions of meaning rather than focusing on the image alone...and not only placed individual images in the context of the whole corpus of rock art figures at the site, but also included other features of the landscaping, such as springs, plants, birds, and so on"[26].
In regard to the polemic relation noted by Young, the power to evoke narrative or to give names in ritual text is its demonstrated effectiveness in a given context which is dependent upon an accumulation of knowledge, or in the case of the interpretation of images is based upon the organization of diverse images into a given context where each individual image is related to the narrative according to its form and function as determined in accumulated myth. Multireferentiality is transitivity among the harmonious interrelations of all things and individuation is manifest as a thing standing for itself according to its form and function as determined within a context as perceived by a perspective taker. An image in isolation has many meanings but it is also constrained as a means to evoke a narrative. Such statements as "images that go on pottery" or "they seem to go together" are indicative of the ambiguity present in their relation and can only take on meaning by being assembled in conjunction with the form and function of a vessel[27] or some other object. Thus, where the context of an image or design is indeterminate the religious associations concerned will inhibit a naming or narrative because of the danger of a deviant utterance. As Young's card sorting analysis showed, in the absence of content images were categorized according to form, and sensual, aesthetic appreciation was insufficient to evoke a name.
This would seem to confirm Bunzel's interpretation of the sensual, but in an anthropological sense of a theory about rationality as a social fact, irrationality is used to describe deviant utterance[28]. This would presuppose an ontological sense of rationality where the viewpoint of the perspective taker does not guarantee objectivity, but objectivity is found in the personal accomplishment of an intersubjectivity required in reciprocal public intentions[29] and the decision not to act (verbalize) could be considered rational. To appreciate an object sensually yet not specify that object in linguistic expression in respect of religious beliefs and for fear of danger to one's self and the common good in the prospect of violating socially approved observances is rational thought. In the absence of verbal expression a sensual, aesthetic appreciation can be rational and in accordance with the collective force of the people, that is, it would be a personal accomplishment.
Our use of language is "constrained by our knowledge of objective reality" and "naming is seen as a process which confers contextual significance on objective continuities and discontinuities in nature; and a properly contextual account of naming requires that we include connotative and metaphoric considerations in a description of the meaning of names"[30]. This suggests that lexical variation corresponds to the importance and stability of constrictive contexts where names make distinctions where contexts require and reference becomes stable only when it is necessary that a particular discrimination be made; otherwise, referential distinction does not operate on the level of individual lexemes and may be used to do more than point[31]. "Through metaphor men discover relevant resemblances between categories which are not ordinarily related to one another and men signify these resemblances in words"[32].
Rosaldo's distinction between referential and metaphoric corresponds to Samarin's distinction between the referential and expressive usage of language. Samarin also notes that the expressive use as distinct from the referential use transcends category boundaries[33]. For example, in the English language the statement "You're a skunk" does more than point and is an expressive use of language. It would transcend certain categorical boundaries in ignoring the specific differences of two individual entities. In regard to the Zuni use of language, this statement would not transcend any category boundaries typifying any specific beings and would not be considered expressive or metaphoric in that sense, for in referential distinction all connotation and metaphor have been accounted for in contextual significance. What is a metaphoric or expressive statement in one language may not have a metaphoric or expressive counterpart in another language. As Rosaldo noted, lexical variation is dependent upon the stability of context and reference, and Samarin states that the inventory of expressive language is inverse to the referential use. The lack of category boundaries within the Zuni taxonomic structure of beings[34] would imply a low inventory of expressive terms.
Consider the Navajo language where a single lexeme multireferentially includes all hues of blue and green and the principle signification of the word is the sacred stone (turquoise)[35]. The stone itself is appreciated for its aesthetic properties and has religious associations, thus, the lexical constraint, or the evident lack of the need to make further particular discriminations among the wide spectrum of blues and greens shows its importance and the stability of constructual contexts. To the outsider this lack of lexical variation to make particular distinctions may appear ambiguous and represent a lack of stability in context. Showing a turquoise stone, which may display any combination of blue and green, would evoke the same response time after time. Any further expected verbalization in color terms would be to ask the Navajo to disrupt the contextual stability of their lexical environment by creating categorical boundaries by means of expressive or metaphoric terms, that is, to operate on the level of individual lexemes that may do more than point. Thus, in all likelihood, further referential distinction would be expressed in the name of a mountain or some other specific geographic location from which the stone originated.
Notes
[24] Bunzel,does note that new masks and dances are not uncommon and do allow for aesthetic expression; however, all new dances must be approved by the head priest of the kiva, and the masks must be defined and absorbed by society. Any new creation is completely integrated. In this is evident that aesthetics can provide for epistemic fulfillment in diachronic development.
[25] Op. cit. Young, 1988: 159.
[26] (Ibid, xvii, italics mine)
[27] (Cushing, see Green 1979: 227-245) Green, Jesse, ed. Zuni: Selected Writings of Frank Hamilton Cushing. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1979.
[28] Willard, Charles. A Theory of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1989:160.
[29] Ibid, 163.
[30] Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist. "Metaphor and Folk Classification". In Southwestern Journal of Anthropology. 28: 83-99, 1972: 84.
[31] Ibid, 87.
[32] Ibid, 92.
[33] Samarin, William. "Inventory and Choice in Expressive Language". Word. 26: 153-169, 1970: 153-154.
[34] Cushing, Frank Hamilton. "Zuni Fetishes". Second Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, 1880-1881. Pp. 3-45. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883. Reprint, KC Publications, 1966 and Walker, Willard. "Inflection and Taxonomic Structure in Zuni". International Journal of American Linguistics. 32(3): 217-227, 1966.
[35] The term for blue or green is dootł'izh. Turquoise is the same, except with emphasis and length on the last syllable (dootł'izhii). (Young, Robert W. and William Morgan. The Navajo Language. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980). Attempts to describe turquoise in terms of blue and green refer to the same term conjunctively or disjunctively and will thus be described referentially in terms of things (per an informant who is an artist and jeweler and an informant who isn't).
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