Jaakko Hintikka: Philosophical Presuppositions

The language universalist would not accept a doctrine that subscribes to semantic ideas conveyed conceptually and would, at least in the case of Wittgenstein, for example, limit context to the meaning a word gains in its usage in the language.  In the case of the Zuni, where meaning can be expressed non-verbally, the lack of a name would, according to the universalist, preclude ascertaining an existent's identity.  Both universalist and relativist would probably agree that "the bridge between the subjective and the objective is the observer who is also a participant. There is no universe with an observer and no observer who is not a part of the universe of description.  The identity of the two is not, nor can never be identical"[51].  Friedrich continues that the role of the observer is also that of the participant and in a manner similar to the Heisenberg principle can effect the outcome of observation, i.e. the participant's description.  In this Friedrich is establishing the perspective taker as an efficient cause that has been eliminated in the universalist position.  For assuming that semantic ideas could be conveyed conceptually and non-verbally, then same name usage is not sufficient to establish identity and ontological status.  Identity is then dependent upon other, perhaps pragmatic interpretations of the form and function of things as relations of semantic ideas and to the universalist the subject becomes transcendent, in Kantian terms, and interpretation is meaningless.

Hintikka also cites the "mutual dependence of linguistic relativity (impossibility of expressing reality as it is, considered independently of our language) and the ineffability thesis of semantics", and would probably describe Friedrich's position as generally stating the paradox of transcendental knowledge[52]. The language universalist and the relativist would however, disagree on the role of the participant, and in Kantian terminology, would also disagree on the constitution of the transcendental subject defined as the logic of scientific language.  While Kant would assert that possession of the concept of a thing is dependent upon knowing the "use" of an object given in intuition and this cognition is a prerequisite to consciousness[53], Wittgenstein would appropriately call this transcendental but as a transcendental subject it is also something that does not exist in the world[54], an allusion that Kant would refer to as an interpretation of the transcendent and not the transcendental[55].

According to this interpretation of a transcendental subject as something that does not exist in the world, Kant would be considered a linguistic relativist[56].  Hintikka states that Wittgenstein held both sides of the linguistic counterpart to the paradox of transcendental knowledge where "the existence of an object can only be shown through its name's use in the language"[57].  "The ineffability of the simple name-object relation...amounts to maintaining that the existence of an individual can only be shown by means of language through the use of its name"[58]; it cannot be stated.  Identity is shown by the use of the same name. It is impossible to say what a particular object is, and likewise impossible to say what its logical form is.  Individual existence is inexpressible and the world as a whole is inexpressible[59].  The relativist could take exception to this, stating that logical form can be rationalized by reciprocal public intentions, and that the name's use in language presupposes knowing the use of the object.

Both of these positions are thoroughly grounded in the view that "human action is constitutive of the meanings of the world of our concepts more generally" and this view should be accepted for pragmatic reasons because "we cannot detach ourselves from our concepts, for we cannot possibly stop our conceptual practices without losing our concepts"[60].  Hintikka's criticism of this is that it is transcendental and "there is no reason why the concepts we need to master in order to talk about our language could not also be grounded on human activities. Hence, the pragmatic rationale for the ineffability of our conceptual world is not a valid one"[61].

Since truth is that part of a relation within the totality of such relationships linking language and the world and is presumed to be conveyed in a linguistic expression about the world, the ineffability thesis of semantics is a thesis of the inexpressibility of truth.  While Hintikka would prefer the term "indefinable" rather than inexpressible, either way it would appear that the universalist cannot speak of truth in terms of correspondence, or as a cross-cultural identifier.  Suggested remedies of language as a calculus ratiocination or possible world semantics appear to be designed for an explication of a syllogistic validity cross-culturally, that is, cross identification as the "identification of individuals across the boundaries of possible worlds" which results in "well defined individuations" as an "objectivity of individuating functions"[62].  Hintikka states that "truth is not ineffable, but it is indefinable, except by transcending the language for which it has to be defined"[63].  In this Hintikka seems to be describing the "unspeakable" of Wittgenstein or that area Langer describes as the "unexplored possibility of genuine semantics beyond the limits of discursive language"[64].  Semantics is wider than language and contains non-discursive, non-translatable symbolism the form and function of which are not investigated by logicians under the heading of language[65].  In principle, the "growth law" of semantics is metaphor[66].

In terms of (2) and a possible world semantics, it is insufficient in regard to defining truth across possible worlds, for unintentional metaphoric fancy will always be lost in the defining of intentional, well defined individuations, meaning that truth will always be nothing more than a synchronic glimpse, in contrast to, for instance, a Kantian pragmatics where the synchronic continually eclipses itself as diachronic development by means of the need for epistemic fulfillment. "Well defined individuations" may find objectivity where the individuating function is directed toward a well organized body of principles, but the subjectivity constituted by the individuating functions cannot be objectified.

                                                                                                                         Next Page>>>

Notes